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Reflections on Israel's Public
Diplomacy
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1 One  of  the  least  understood  and  most  reviled  activity  of  virtually  all  of  Israel's
governments since 1948 has been its public diplomacy, also known as Hasbara, the Hebrew
term that can be translated as explaining and disseminating information in addition to
being propaganda. The last term became intolerable due to its use by the Nazis. Most
critics of Israel's public diplomacy efforts, both at home and abroad, focused not on the
policies  of  Israel  but  on  how  they  were  marketed  and  their  success  or  failure  in
convincing opinion and decision makers in the justice of Israel's cause. Few realized that
Hasbara was at best a supportive action, not an end in itself. But it was always an easy
target with which to attack any government in Israel and thus Israel's advocacy gained
far greater attention than it deserves. The purpose of this paper is to argue that the focus
on Israel's public diplomacy has been greatly exaggerated and over-inflated and that a
more  rational  understanding  of  its  nature  will  lead to  placing  Hasbara in  a  broader
context  of  Israeli  foreign  and  defense  policies.  The  basic  premise  derives  from  a
statement attributed to the founder of Israel David Ben-Gurion who said: “Never mind
what the gentiles say,  what counts is what the Jews will  do.” I  fully subscribe to his
dictum, while the critics of Israel's foreign and defense policy challenge it. 
2 For the purpose of discussion, the history of Israel will be divided to five distinct periods:
1948-1967, 1967-1977, 1977-1991, 1991-1996 and the last one since 1996 to the present.
The  Hasbara efforts  of  each  era  will  be  considered  from the  perspectives  of  Israel's
political  leadership  of  the  time,  information  content,  organization,  structure,
implementation and success-failure. Obviously, special attention will be paid to the major
political-defense  developments  of  the  time  and  the  role  of  the  Israeli  leadership  in
dealing with Hasbara. The paper is based not so much on academic research but on the
experience of the writer gained over many years as head of the Government Press Office
in Jerusalem, and in that capacity as occasional spokesman for the bureaus of three prime
ministers (Eshkol, Meir and Rabin), as a senior officer for the United Israel Appeal dealing
with disseminating information among Jewish communities in the Diaspora, and finally as
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an academic,  teaching courses on Israeli  foreign policy at the Rothberg International




3 This era can be characterized for Hasbara purpose as one of Israel emerging from a long
War of Independence, still under siege, not yet recognized by many nations, and usually
treated with kid gloves out of the desire not to attack Jews so soon after the Holocaust.
Israel also spoke with one authoritative voice, was governed during those years by one
major  party  (Mapai),  and  although  Mapai  headed  a  coalition  government,  the  top
positions, those of Prime Minister, Defense Minister and Foreign Minister were held by
ministers belonging to that  party.  The country's  leadership still  felt  it  had to justify
Israel's existence and had to convince others that the new political reality was going to be
a permanent factor and feature in the Middle East. Their goal at the time was to ensure
the survival of the state. They realized this could be achieved by mass immigration, vast
economic aid and availability of weapons. This applied to the years 1949-1956, before the
Sinai War, when many doubted Israel's chances for survival. 
4 The foreign press corps in Israel, numbering less than fifty permanent correspondents,
many  of  them  Israelis  working  for  foreign  outlets,  provided  the  main  source  of
information on Israel. What counted at the time were the print media, radio, and the
emerging  new  instrument  – television.  The  technology  was  by  today's  standards
rudimentary, overseas phone calls were rare and had to be ordered hours in advance and
cables  and  telexes  were  the  most  modern  means  of  communications.  Under  these
circumstances it was easy for the government to impose censorship on sensitive military
and even political information, and that was often extended to item regarding sources of
immigration,  weapons,  oil  and even the names of  key officials  such as  heads  of  the
Mossad and General Security Services. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion did not even bother to
have a spokesman. Secrecy was the norm. There were few official organizations dealing
with the media – chief among them were the IDF Spokesman's Unit, the Foreign Ministry
Spokesman,  the  Government  Press  Office  in  the  Prime  Minister's  Office  and  on  the
domestic  scene  the  Information  Center  which  sought  to  disseminate  and  instill
democratic  values  to  the  very  heterogeneous  Israeli  society  then  in  the  midst  of
absorbing  mass  immigration  from over  100  countries  and  territories  speaking  some
twenty languages and coming from diverse cultural backgrounds. There was little intra-
agency infighting and it was easy to obtain coordination among the information bodies.
Official spokesman did not have a difficult task of disseminating the official viewpoint as
the country spoke in one voice. 
5 However,  even  then  questions  about  Israel's  defense  and  foreign  policies  began  to
emerge. They focused on the policy of cross border retaliatory raids, ties with Germany,
its policy of neutrality in the Cold War that ended in 1950 when Israel opted to join the
Western camp led by the United States after the outbreak of the Korean War. From 1955,
when Egypt began receiving vast amount of modern weapons from the Soviet Union, the
question arose if Israel should embark on a defensive war. Following that war Israel's
image improved significantly and in the late 1950's it was obvious that Israel was here to
stay. By then Israel began to implement large scale foreign aid programs mainly in the
new nations of  Africa and was beginning to act  as a normal nation no longer under
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immediate  threat  to  its  existence.  Two  major  events  attracted  hundreds  of  foreign
reporters to Israel 800 for the Eichmann Trial in 1961 and 1200 to cover the visit of Pope
Paul  VI  in  January  1964.  The  media  coverage  was  well  organized  by  the  Israeli
government and afforded many reporters a glimpse of Israel they never knew existed – a
country  quietly  going  about  its  way  in  developing  science,  technology,  medicine,
literature,  dance,  drama,  cooperative  agricultural  settlements  such as  Kibbutzim and
Moshavim and  even  successfully  revived  its  ancient  language.  One  major  item  was
censored, Israel's nuclear development efforts. They remain secret to this very day. By
and large, it can be said that the international media treated Israel fairly and its image
was positive.
6 In spite of these seeming normalcy, already in the early years of Israel, the heads of the
Hasbara faced a major problem – how to portray Israel. Should they focus on a nation at
war, a country still largely under siege, constantly involved in small border skirmishes
with its neighbors. That would be helpful for the purposes of fund raising. The other
option was to depict Israel as a normal nation, involved in a long and difficult process of
nation  building.  Siege  mentality  would  frighten  potential  immigrants, tourists  and
foreign investors. Portraying Israel as a nation at peace would not reflect reality. Israel's
faces the same issue today in dealing with the threat of a nuclear Iran.
 
1967-1977
7 All this changed abruptly with the unexpected and unplanned Six Days War in June 1967.
As a result, and at the time of waning colonialism, Israel was increasingly seen as an
occupying power, ruling over millions of Palestinians, involved in building settlements on
disputed land, engaged in a prolonged War of Attrition. From dealing with the Arab-Israel
conflict  in  general,  the  focus  was  now  on  the  Israel-Palestinian  conflict  and  the
emergence of Palestinian nationalism. A new generation of reporters, many of them grew
up well after World War II, who knew little of the Holocaust, concentrated on depicting
the plight of the occupied Palestinians. In Israel itself serious disagreements rose over its
policies.  There was no longer unanimity among the Mapai leadership. Prime Minister
Meir, Defense Minister Dayan and Information Minister Galili (who was responsible for
information in Israel alone) favored an activist policy of not yielding territory to the
Arabs without the achievement of a full fledged peace treaty obtained as a result of direct
negotiations.  The Arab policy  stressed three  No's  – no peace,  no recognition and no
negotiations with Israel. Foreign Minister Eban was far more conciliatory and felt Israel
should make territorial concessions in advance of direct negotiations. Finance Minister
Sapir wanted to return the territories even without peace. It can be safely said that the
domestic and the international media focused mainly on the issue – the future of the
territories.  Israel's Hasbara officials could only explain the various approaches in the
country to central issue and arrange for many points of view to be heard. They ranged for
annexing the territories to returning them back to Jordan, Syria and Egypt even without a
peace treaty. The Meir government saw the territories as bargaining chips for future
negotiations  with  Arab  countries  and  shunned  any  negotiations  with  the  emerging
Palestine Liberation Organization, seen as a terrorist group intent on destroying Israel. As
a result, there was virtually no movement towards any political settlement of the conflict
and Israel's image took a beating. 
Reflections on Israel's Public Diplomacy
Bulletin du Centre de recherche français à Jérusalem, 23 | 2012
3
8 Blame was  placed at  the  door  of  the  information agencies  who were  subjected to  a
number of inquiry commissions who drew up various recommendations to improve the
situation. Few argued that Israel's policies were at the root of its problems and not the
organizational structure and effectiveness of its Hasbara. By now new actors entered the
field of information – a spokesman for the Defense Minister, a spokesman for the Prime
Minister, a spokesman for the IDF military government in the territories under Israel's
control, not to mention scores of others who sought to speak for Israel among them the
Jewish Agency, the Histadrut trade union organization, various political parties and the
many fund raising organizations. This resulted in much confusion as to who really speaks
for  Israel.  From  1967  to  1970  there  was  also  a  government  of  national  unity  that
compounded the problem,  as  it  included for  the first  time Menahem Begin a  strong
supporter of the status quo and massive settlement in the territories. Ideas of setting up a
separate ministry of information were vehemently opposed by Foreign Minister Eban
who argued that overseas Hasbara was a central foreign ministry responsibility. 
9 The Yom Kippur War demonstrated the confusion and lack of central direction in Israel's
information efforts and led to additional inquiry committees that recommended once
again  centralizing  the  efforts  under  one  roof  – either  a  cabinet  level  ministry  or  a
government authority. It was also realized that new technologies required new solutions.
There was direct overseas dialing, fax machines were introduced and television satellite
stations were also installed. The foreign press corps in Israel grew from some 50 to over
300 and the country became a major source of information. The focus of attention was
now once again on the very legitimacy of  Israel  and its  right  to  exist  as  a  separate
political,  sovereign,  Jewish  and  Zionist  state.  This  became  acute  especially  after  the
adoption of General Assembly Resolution 3379 in November 1975 equating Zionism with
racism. The new Rabin government, that succeeded the Meir cabinet which resigned in
April 1974, did set up for a brief time a separate Ministry of Information, but that did not
resolve  the  problem as  serious  disagreements  soon erupted  between Prime  Minister
Rabin, Defense Minister Peres and Foreign Minister Allon. Once again, Israel did not speak
in one voice. The ministry failed because the incumbent, Aharon Yariv, did not insist on
centralizing all the information efforts under one roof, it was also poorly funded. But
above all  Prime Minister Rabin was not  that  keen on its  existence and thought that
overseas information should be under the Foreign Ministry. In spite of progress on the
diplomatic  front  and the signing of  two major agreements  between Israel  and Egypt
(Separation of Forces in 1974 and an Interim Agreement in 1975) and a Separation of
Forces agreement with Syria in 1974, there was no real progress towards broader peaceful
relations  with  the  Arab  neighbors.  More  attention  was  devoted  to  domestic  Israeli
politics, settlements, corruption in high levels of government and a sense of a drifting
Israel with no effective, visionary and imaginative leadership.
10 And yet, during that decade (1967-1977) Israel produced vast amount of information in
the international media, far exceeding its size and/or the importance of the country.
Israel became a big story in every respect. Why the focus on Israel, and not, for example,
on the 22 Arab state members of the Arab League with their vast oil wealth and huge
population?  The  columnist  Tom Friedman  may  have  given  the  right  answer  to  this
question.  He  once  wrote  that  Israel's  story  in  many respects  is  the  tale  of  Western
civilization, which is based on the Judeo-Christian traditions and ethics. These were well
understood in the in the West and Israel was expected to behave accordingly. It,  too,
sought to be Light unto the Nations. Israel therefore was measured in a different manner
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and yardsticks than the Arab states. When Israel is charged with what is deemed to be
war crimes, it becomes the subject of international condemnation and subject to censure
by  the  United  Nations,  the  European  Union  and  other  international  bodies.  It  is
threatened with boycotts, both economic and academic. When Arabs commit the same
crimes, as witnessed in the civil war raging in Syria since 2011, with the loss over 30,000
people mostly civilians, their actions are not criticized as Israel's would be. There is a well
known saying: “When Arabs kill Arabs – no news; when Jews kill Arabs – that's news. No
amount of positive Israeli information can overcome this dictum. From 1968 Israel started
its own television broadcasts and now Israelis could see how others viewed them, and the
interest in Hasbara intensified.
11 Another dilemma arose – most of the reporters and stringers covering Israel were Jews.
Israelis expected them to be supportive and friendly. They themselves wanted to be seen
as fair and honest irrespective of their religion. Their editors also wanted to appear as
open minded and fair. This by and large hurt Israel's image. Israel's image was the victim
of this anomalous situation.
 
1977-1991
12 The 1977  Knesset  elections  brought  to  power  the  Likud right  wing nationalist  party
headed by Menahem Begin, for years considered as hawkish. He appointed Moshe Dayan
as his foreign minister. Both leaders made no efforts to create a separation information
body.  Suddenly, on  19  November  1977  Israel's  and  the  Middle  East  history  changed
dramatically when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat arrived in Jerusalem for a two days
visit. That brought to Jerusalem over 1200 reporters from around the world, including
some of the most prominent journalists. They focused predominantly on Sadat's vision
and less on what was perceived as Begin's unimaginative response. The foreign, mostly
American  media  played  a  major  role,  when,  for  example,  Begin  and  Sadat  were
interviewed separately albeit on one screen by the stars of the three leading American
networks. Sadat, a master of drama, won the battle for the American media (and Congress
and the American Jewish Community) for what was perceived as his sincerity and broad
vision. Attention was now on the evolution of the peace process, and when it foundered
in the course of 1978, Begin was blamed for much of the failure. Within several weeks
after Sadat's visit, Begin appeared to have lost the support of the American media, which
was also fed by a hostile Carter Administration. Growing doubts in Israel about Begin's
intents and sincerity that prompted, among other things, the creation of the Peace Now
Movement, also made it difficult for those responsible for information to make headway.
Some of Begin's closest advisers on Hasbara were totally opposed to making territorial
concessions to Egypt in return for peace.  The singing of  the Camp David Framework
Agreements  in  September  1978  came  as  a  shock  to  Israelis  and  Egyptians.  It  was
negotiated in total secrecy and led for the first time in Israel's history to the signing of a
peace  treaty  (with  Egypt  in  March  1979).  Begin's  spokesman  had  a  major  problem
explaining why members of Begin's own party either voted against or abstained in the
Knesset vote on adopting the Camp David Accords and it was passed only because the
Labor Party voted in favor. 
13 But Israel's image problems did not improve overnight. Focus was now on settlement
activities and the growing realization stressed by Begin that he gave up all of Sinai for
peace with Egypt and in order to retain the West Bank. Between 1979 and 1982 focus was
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on the implementation of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty and from June 1982 on the first
war in Lebanon, a war of choice to use Begins description. That war split Israeli society
and this was reflected in the dispatches of the foreign media. Initial restrictions by the
IDF on the coverage of that war from the Israeli side, meant that the story was sent by
reporters Based in Beirut, and represented the Arab side. New technologies now included
cellular phones and greater use of TV satellite transmissions which resulted in instant
access in any place on earth.
14 When Begin resigned in August 1983 he was succeeded by Yitzhak Shamir who espoused a
policy  of  strict  adherence  to  the  status  quo.  There  was  no  progress  on  the  Israel-
Palestinian track and that inevitably led to the outbreak of the first Palestinian Intifadah
(shaking off) in December 1987. That uprising was a disaster for Israel's Hasbara. The
Israeli response was not coordinated, once again Israel spoke with three voices – that of
Prime Minister Shamir, Foreign Minister Peres and Defense Minister Rabin, all members
of a rotating national unity cabinet that existed from m1984 to 1990. The government of
Israel seemingly lost control over the coverage of the uprising in which the Palestinians
were far more adept at dealing with the foreign media.
15 One event in 1991 helped Israel's image – the first Gulf War. The country came under
attack by Scud missiles fired from Iraq, Prime Minister Shamir wisely decided to accede to
the American demand and refrain from an Israeli military involvement. Israel was once
again portrayed as a victim of Arab aggression who bowed to American and international
pressure and kept out of the war. The war led directly to an Arab-Israeli peace conference
in Madrid, with the participation of the two super powers, the European Union, the Gulf
States and above all Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.
The chief Israeli spokesman was Benjamin Netanyahu who shone as one who understood
the media, especially television, its needs, requirements and deadlines. He became the
Israeli information star, and was not eclipsed even by the Palestinian star Hanan Ashrawi.
The very fact that five Arab states were sitting and negotiating with Israel publicly helped
improve Israel's image. 
 
1991-1996
16 The years 1992-1996 were marked by the Oslo process whereby Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization negotiated and signed in Washington in September 1993 the
Declaration of Principles. This time a new Israeli government headed by Rabin, with Peres
as his foreign minister, was able to negotiate and deliver an agreement with its arch
enemy Yasser Arafat head of the PLO. Israel's image soared. Peres spoke of a new Middle
East and even suggested downgrading the Hasbara effort in favor of concentrating on
economic  ties.  Once  again  it  was  seen  that  when  Israel  pursues  a  policy  deemed
conciliatory that has the support of the international community, there is no need for a
Ministry  of  Information  or  a  central  Information  Authority.  The  deeds  speak  for
themselves and those responsible for Hasbara basically have to make sure the reporters
cover the events, among them the singing of the Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty in October
1994 and the Israel-PLO Interim Agreement in September 1995. But like Begin's problem
in 1978, Rabin's spokesmen had much difficulty in explaining why the Israel-PLO Interim
Agreement with the PLO was adopted by the Knesset in September 1995 by a majority of
one. 
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17 By then brand new technologies were at the disposal of the media – internet, emails,
cellular  phones  and  camcords.  This  meant  that  Israeli  military  censorship  lost  its
effectiveness.  The  number  of  the  foreign  press  corps  in  Israel  and  the  Palestinian
territories grew vastly. That now included scores of Palestinians acting as stringers and
resource persons for the Israel based correspondents using camcords and cell phones as
their main tools. Speed was now of essence. Israel was also helped very much by a very
friendly Clinton Administration.
 
1996 to the present
18 All this came to an abrupt end when Rabin was assassinated on 4 November 1995.
19 The  first  Netanyahu  government  decided  not  to  abrogate  the  Oslo  agreements  but
effectively to slow down the process. Very little progress was achieved by Netanyahu
during his first term as Prime Minister. Among them the withdrawal from Hebron in
early 1997 and the beginning of some withdrawal in the West Bank in late 1998 that
brought down his government. Serious disagreements with his foreign ministers David
Levy and later Ariel Sharon were evident and did not help matters. Prime Minister Barak
started negotiations with Syria that eventually failed, withdrew the IDF from Lebanon
and made unexpected offers to Arafat in their July 2000 Camp David summit. But Arafat
failed to respond mainly on the issues of  Jerusalem,  Palestinian refugees and end of
conflict clause. The failure of Camp David summit was followed once again by the second
Intifadah which this time was lethal, costing the lives of some 1400 Israelis. Since Barak
seemed to have failed to stem the uprising, he lost the support of his loose coalition and
resigned. He was succeeded by Ariel Sharon who put down the uprising by force in a
series of military operations. Their success was noticeable, but the cost in terms of Israel's
image was hard to swallow. Israel was accused of committing war crimes and violating
the  various  Geneva  Conventions  applying  to  occupied  territories.  Sharon  paid  little
attention to Israel's image. In this respect he followed his mentor Ben Gurion. He was far
more interested in improving ties with the Bush Administration, in which he succeeded,
that with any dramatic moves. But he, too, realized that some drama was needed and
ordered the withdrawal of all Israeli presence from the Gaza Strip and small parts of the
West Bank. Once again Israel was praised, but the cost in terms of dissent in Israeli society
and politics  was vast.  In early 2006 Sharon suffered a stroke from which he did not
recover.
20 His successor Ehud Olmert launched a war against Lebanon in the summer of 2006 and
once again serious public relations errors were evident. The media was not taken to the
fighting area, it had to rely on IDF briefings and the entire information effort was harshly
criticized by a commission of inquiry that followed the war. 
21 In the past twenty years there have been few changes in Israel's image. There are many
reasons for that. Among them, growing fatigue with the Arab-Israel conflict, the rise of a
new generation that did not know the Holocaust, and for whom Israel has always been
there and was a living fact. It was clear that Israel did not solve the “Jewish Problem” or
help eradicate anti-Semitism. The opposite is true. Serious misgivings in Israel over the
country's policies were also reflected in the reporting of the foreign press corps whose
numbers now stands at some 350 (print, radio, television). There has been little effort on
the  part  of  the  first  Netanyahu government,  the  Barak government  (1999-2001),  the
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Sharon government  (2001-2006),  the  Olmert  Government  (2006-2009)  and the  second
Netanyahu  Government  (2009-2013)  to  make  major  structural  changes  in  Israel's
information  apparatus.  The  key  change  was  to  create  in  2009  a  Ministry  for  Public
Diplomacy which was tacked onto the Ministry for Diaspora Affairs. 
22 The main flaws of  Israel's  information efforts  remain to this  very day.  They include
multiplicity of agencies dealing with the foreign media, chief among them the National
Information Headquarters centered in the Prime Minister's Office and directly under the
guidance of the Prime Minister. That has eclipsed the Public Diplomacy Ministry whose
chief is not even a member of the inner cabinet. The Foreign Ministry has effectively been
frozen out of the international Hasbara effort,  partly because the minister since 2009
(Avigdor  Lieberman)  has  come  out  openly  against  the  policies  of  Prime  Minister
Netanyahu and was not even aware that secret indirect negotiations were taking place in
2010 and 2011 between Netanyahu and Defense Minister Barak and Bashar el Assad in
Syria on the other. Two events hurt Israel's image badly – one was the Second War in
Lebanon in July – August 2006 and the second Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in December
2008-January  2009.  Serious  differences  of  opinions  erupted  between  Prime  Minister
Olmert and Foreign Minister Livni during the Second War in Lebanon. In Gaza, the foreign
media was not allowed into the strip for many days causing false information to emerge
from there  that  could not  be  verified.  One result  of  the  war  was  the issuing of  the
Goldstone Report that accused Israel of war crimes. In the field of technology the 21st
century witnessed the emergence of the social media in the shape of Facebook, Twitter
and various web blogs that became a major source of information and could in no way be
controlled.  No wonder that  repeated State  Comptroller  reports  dealing with Hasbara
found for a constant lack of an overall strategic public relations conception and objective,
lack of coordination between the many organizations and very modest funding.
 
Conclusion
23 It is almost impossible not to agree with Abba Eban who in addressing the Knesset in
December 1973 said that he felt a “sense of intellectual frustration when the issue of how
the  government  communications  is  taken out  of  the  context  of  the  political  reality.
Because what really affects our image at the end of the day is not the skill of the policy
advocate; it's not the salesman, nor the wrapper, but the goods themselves that matter…
Israel's image is not a product solely of the words its diplomats use: it is a product of the
entirety of Israel's reality as seen from the outside. Her position, style, atmosphere, the
way her society conducts itself,  her approach to peace, to relations with neighboring
countries, her position on universal human values, her view of her own and the world's
culture and heritage – all these are taken into account”. Eban was absolutely right when
he argued that Israel's image is not made by official representatives or ministers, but by
the totality of factors. His words ring true to this very day. 
24 He  omitted  to  mention  two  other  factors  that  harmed  attempts  at  centralized
government guided information structure. The first was a free press in Israel, protected
by law and by the Supreme Court. The Israeli media has been notably critical of all of
Israel's governments. It serves as a major source for the foreign press corps in Jerusalem,
which  is  still  the  largest  in  the  Middle  East.  It  was  very  difficult  to  fault  foreign
correspondents in Israel for reports that were based on reports in the Israeli media. The
second factor is Israeli democracy. This means that there is access to most events, getting
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government accreditation is easy, and above all in a country where there are at least ten
political parties at any given time, there are at least ten views. This may be confusing but
Israel prides itself on its democracy which admittedly, makes it impossible to control the
media, both domestic and foreign. Unlike Arab states or other non-democratic societies,
where the government control both information and accessibility to events, in Israel the
press can operate freely with minimal  restrictions,  with the exception maybe during
military operations such as the war in Lebanon or in Gaza. The coalition make up of all of
Israel's governments also means that it cannot speak in one voice.
25 In the battle between freedom of the press, democracy and the right to know, against
information convenience and control of the press for the purpose of gaining a better
image, the choice is obvious – democracy and free press.
ABSTRACTS
Israel's public diplomacy has been the subject of much abuse and vilification both in Israel and
abroad. This is largely due to the misunderstanding between policies and the marketing of those
policies.  Critics  of  Israel's  Hasbara efforts  usually  argue  that  poor  funding,  organizational
infighting,  multiplicity  of  bodies  dealing  with  Hasbara,  low  level  and  quality  of  officials  are
responsible for Israel's poor image mainly in Western countries. They fail to look at the broader
picture  in  which  information  is  a  supporting  action,  designed  to  assist  the  formulation  and
implementation of a policy by marketing it properly. The fact remains that when Israel pursued
what was seen as a positive policy, signed peace treaties and made territorial concessions, its
image improved dramatically. When it adhered to a policy of immobilism its image plunged. The
paper describes the evolution of Israel's public diplomacy since 1948.
La  diplomatie  publique  d'Israël  a  été  souvent  vilipendée  en  Israël  et  à  l'étranger.  Ceci  est
largement dû à une différence entre la politique et le marketing de la politique. Les critiques de
la hasbara israélienne soutiennent généralement que le maigre financement, les luttes intestines
et la multiplicité des organisations responsables, le faible niveau professionnel sont responsables
de  la  médiocre  image  d'Israël,  surtout  dans  les  pays  occidentaux.  Ils  n'élargissent  pas  leur
perspective jusqu'à voir que l'information soutient l'action, afin d'aider à formuler et à mettre en
œuvre une politique par un marketing adéquat.  Il  demeure que lorsqu'Israël a poursuivi une
politique  positive,  signé  des  traités  de  paix,  fait  des  concessions,  son  image  s'est
considérablement améliorée. Quand le pays a choisi l'immobilisme, l'image s'est dégradée. Cet
article décrit l'évolution de la diplomatie publique israélienne depuis 1948. 
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